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Abstract:  
This article analyzes the prospects for globalizing the Varieties of Capitalism debate. It 
identifies and compares firm-centered, governance-centered and state-centered 
approaches to extending the debate on capitalist diversity and discusses the distinctive 
contributions of each approach as well as the trade-offs between them. It draws on three 
agenda-setting books that engage with the varieties of capitalism framework and study 
capitalist diversity in three regions not usually covered by this literature, namely East 
Central Europe, Latin America, and East and South East Asia. As these regions play an 
increasingly important role in the world economy, this article examines what these books 
imply about the current state of knowledge about global varieties of capitalism. This article 
argues that the extension of the Varieties of Capitalism debate to these parts of the world is 
important for advancing our understanding of economic institutions and that this approach 
can reinvigorate research on capitalist diversity and the institutional foundations of 
economic development in the current era of globalization.  
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The debate inspired by Peter Hall and David Soskice's seminal volume on Varieties of Capitalism 
(henceforth VoC) has generated one of the most influential literatures in comparative politics 
and political economy in recent years, and the introductory chapter by the editors is the 
foundational statement of this approach.1 VoC is widely perceived to be the dominant 
approach to the comparative political economy of the OECD.2 Scholars in other disciplines, 
including sociology, geography, and business studies, have also engaged with these issues – 
both independently and in reaction to the VoC literature.3  
  The VoC framework focuses on the distinction between two kinds of market 
economies, in which a particular form of economic coordination predominates: market 
coordination in liberal market economies (LME), like Britain and the USA, and strategic 
coordination in coordinated market economies (CME), like Germany and Sweden.  
While this literature has spurred great controversy, much of this debate has been 
limited by its focus on Western Europe, North America and to a lesser extent Japan and the 
Antipodes.  It remains an open question whether this framework can shed light on market 
economies in other parts of the world.  
Traditionally developing countries have been studied separately. Two analytical 
strategies have dominated the literature on the political economy of development in political 
science and sociology. On the one hand, dependency theory and world systems theory have 
focused on the external economic environment and offered a more skeptical analysis of the 
prospects for economic development, as developing countries have been seen as locked into 
structurally unfavorable positions in the global economy.4 These ideas also served as a 
justification for import-substituting industrialization (ISI) and more selective engagement with 
the world economy.5 On the other hand, the rise of Japan and the East Asian miracle 
contributed to greater interest in state-led development, including theories of the 
developmental state, which also have some affinities with classical development economics.6 
These bodies of literature have challenged development thinking associated with the 
Washington consensus as well as much of neoclassical development economics, which has 
focused on strengthening markets and minimizing the scope for government failure.7 
The focus of this article is on three agenda-setting books that engage with the VoC 
framework in three regions not usually covered by the VoC literature: East Central Europe, 
Latin America and East and South-East Asia.8  These are the most influential and compelling 
recent book-length studies of capitalist diversity in these regions.  
Schneider focuses on Latin America, a region which has inspired important 
theoretical contributions to political economy, such as dependency theory.9 There has been 
extensive research on import-substituting industrialization as well as the move to 
neoliberalism and the subsequent left turn of the early 2000s,10 but until recently there 
have been few attempts to incorporate Latin America into the contemporary comparative 
capitalism debate.11 East and South East Asia, the focus of Walter and Zhang’s book, has 
received extensive attention in the literature, though much of this research concentrates 
on the East Asian miracle and the East Asian financial crisis, and is often related to the logic 
of developmental states.12 The analysis of these countries from a comparative 
institutionalist perspective has been surprisingly limited, and most existing analyses have 
focused on Japan.13 The study of East Central Europe, covered by Bohle and Greskovits, 
raises some unique challenges. As markets played a very limited role until the collapse of 
communism in 1989-91, these countries have generally been viewed as transition 
economies. While the early literature was focused on the political economy of reform, 
towards the turn of the millennium sociologists began to explore how different elite 
configurations and class coalitions produced reforms that led to a variety of capitalist systems. 
The most influential typology of this kind is King and Szelényi’s distinction between capitalism 
from above, below and without.14 Bohle and Greskovits’s important book demonstrates that 
there is considerable variation in economic arrangements even among East Central European 
countries that embraced global markets and introduced capitalism from without. 
 Countries in these regions have introduced a variety of market reforms in recent 
decades. Most countries that were once committed to ISI policies are now highly integrated 
with the world economy and full members of the WTO. While there has not been a uniform 
rollback of the state, it now plays a very different role than in the heyday of the 
developmental state.15 Some have even joined the OECD, the club of rich countries. 
Therefore, there has been extensive debate about the contemporary relevance of these 
traditional perspectives to our understanding of the political economy of development.16 The 
time may have come to consider these economies in relation to broader debates about 
varieties of capitalism and to bridge the divide between the literatures on developed and 
developing/transition economies. This article argues that the VoC framework provides an 
excellent starting point for developing a global political economy of capitalism, which also 
incorporates some of the concerns of the classical development literature. It examines 
what these three seminal books imply about the current state of knowledge about global 
varieties of capitalism and identifies questions for future research.  
The core goal animating this article relates to the question how global capitalist 
diversity should be theorized. More specifically, it asks whether the VoC framework is a 
suitable starting point for studying capitalist systems beyond the traditional OECD 
countries. If so, how does the globalization of the VoC framework relate to traditional 
concerns in the political economy of development, such as the role of the state and 
external dependency? Do such perspectives imply that a globalized VoC framework should 
be less firm-centered and adopt a different analytical strategy? To what extent can global 
VoC analysis contribute to a better understanding of key challenges of the global economy, 
such as economic development in an era of globalization? This article analyzes the key VoC 
models identified by these three books and their distinguishing features. It argues that the 
three books can be seen to represent distinctive approaches to globalizing the study of 
Varieties of Capitalism, which this article classifies as firm-centered, governance-centered 
and state-centered. This article discusses the trade-offs between these approaches and 
their contribution to understanding capitalist diversity, but it also suggests that these 
approaches are ultimately complementary, as they address distinct challenges. 
The debate surrounding VoC is extensive.17 Many critics have argued that the 
dichotomous typology of the VoC framework is overly narrow and parsimonious. In fact, it may 
not even capture the full range of political economic systems in the advanced OECD countries. as 
the Southern European countries (including France) are hard to classify as either coordinated or 
liberal market economies.18  Extending the VoC debate beyond the traditional OECD countries 
constitutes a compelling strategy to address these issues and to refine our understanding of 
capitalist diversity and the VoC debate itself. 
However, the debate about VoC has also featured some more specific criticisms, and 
this article focuses on three of them. First, some critics have suggested that the VoC 
framework is incomplete given its excessive focus on firms.19  
Second, it has also been argued that the VoC framework is too focused on efficiency.20 The 
emphasis on efficiency relates to the principal research objectives of the original VoC 
volume, as Hall and Soskice sought to demonstrate how different institutional frameworks 
in the OECD are consistent with economic success over prolonged periods. To the extent 
that variations in economic performance are considered, they are usually related to the 
absence of complementary institutions.21 While the emphasis on the institutional 
foundations of comparative advantage is an important insight, a global perspective provides 
an opportunity to consider the effects of different institutions on economic performance. 
Indeed, it is hard to examine the effect of institutions on development by looking just at the 
OECD, which includes relatively successful economies and hence a relatively limited range of 
outcomes.22 
 
Third, another set of critics see the relative neglect of the state as the main 
shortcoming of the VoC framework.23 This is often combined with a related criticism, which 
suggests that the social and political underpinnings of capitalist systems are underspecified. 
This article demonstrates that these issues can be addressed by globalizing the VoC 
debate, but it is unclear whether all of them can be addressed at once. This article shows 
that there are trade-offs between the approaches developed in these three books, in that 
each of them is particularly successful at addressing one of the three criticisms. As will be 
shown, this reflects different analytical strategies which also relate to different forms of 
institutional analysis.24 Walter and Zhang’s framework is governance-centered. It goes 
beyond the firm and integrates a variety of governance mechanisms into the study of 
capitalist systems. Schneider’s model is firm-centered and relates primarily to formal 
institutions, such as ownership, labor market and corporate governance institutions. It 
extends core ideas of the VoC framework to account for differences in economic 
performance. This enables VoC analysis to move beyond its focus on efficiency. Finally, 
Bohle and Greskovits’s monograph is state-centered and analyzes the politics of capitalist 
diversity, which contributes to a better understanding of the social and political 
embeddedness of market institutions. 
This article is structured as follows. The next section discusses how the three books 
conceptualize capitalist systems beyond the core OECD countries. The following section 
compares these approaches and illustrates key strengths and trade-offs between them in 
the context of three examples, Thailand, Brazil and Hungary. The conclusion reflects on the 
main findings and some broader implications of this analysis for our understanding of VoC 
and economic development.  
 GLOBAL VARIETIES: HOW MANY? 
The VoC approach builds on previous contributions to the study of capitalism, such as state 
traditions, corporatism, and social systems of production schools.25  However, the greatest 
intellectual debt may be to new institutional economics and new institutionalism more 
generally.26  At its core the VoC framework is an institutionalist theory of capitalism based 
on a relational theory of the firm as the key actor in a market economy. Firms can manage 
key relationships with employees, financial institutions, and other firms by means of 
different coordination mechanisms. The main premise of the VoC framework is that a certain 
coordination mechanism tends to predominate in a given economy because of institutional 
complementarities. Hall and Soskice define institutional complementarities in the following way: 
‘two institutions can be said to be complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases 
returns from (or the efficiency of) the other’.27 They also argue that clusters of complementary 
institutions constitute a source of comparative institutional advantage by promoting certain kinds 
of economic specialization, notably related to incremental innovation in high quality 
manufacturing in CMEs and rapid innovation in LMEs. There are two important implications of this 
framework. First, it stresses the importance of studying the relationship between institutions and 
economic activity. Second, it highlights that there is more than one type of institutions that are 
consistent with economic success, but economies with complementary institutions tend to be 
more successful than hybrid economies with incoherent institutional configurations.28  
It is unclear to what extent VoC analysis can shed light on capitalism beyond the 
OECD, as the authors of the original volume did not claim that their theory applied to other 
parts of the world. And even if the main insights of the VoC literature extend beyond these 
countries, it seems clear that it is not possible to fit all political economies of the world into 
the binary distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies without very 
considerable conceptual stretching. This raises important challenges, not least because 
every political economy has some unique features. In other words, how could an augmented 
VoC model balance descriptive accuracy with the theoretical rigor and parsimony of the VoC 
framework? There are no easy answers, as many theories are useful for different purposes. 
Nölke and Vliegenthart suggest three criteria for identifying a new VoC: ‘(1) the existence of 
an alternative overall economic coordination mechanism closely related to (2) a relatively 
stable set of institutions based on marked institutional complementarities, that leads to (3) 
a set of specific comparative advantages (...) and a superior economic performance over 
comparable, but less pure, socioeconomic systems.’ 29  This is a useful benchmark, though 
the assumption of superior economic performance in the third criterion may be too 
restrictive, if we accept that not all political economies are equally efficient and successful. 
Therefore, this article argues that it would be more helpful to consider distinctive rather 
than superior performance. If one views VoC as ideal types, then these varieties should be 
seen as theoretical constructs capturing core logics of economic organization, and it is then 
an empirical challenge to assess just how closely a particular economy comes to a given 
ideal type at a particular moment and whether there is change over time.30  Empirical 
analysis can demonstrate the usefulness of the theory as well as the degree to which 
specific cases conform with or deviate from a specific VoC and what kind of economic 
performance they are associated with. 
The three books considered here adopt different strategies for extending the VoC 
framework and analyzing the role of the state in the economy. While all of them focus on 
the relationship between economic activity, economic institutions and the political 
underpinnings of market economies and share the view that there are systematic national 
differences across capitalist systems, the analytical strategies and emphases differ. This 
article shows that each of the three books corresponds to one of the three forms of 
institutional analysis beyond the study of actual economic transactions that were identified 
by Williamson.31 First, institutional analysis can focus on the governance of economic action 
– this includes a variety of governance mechanisms that are typically quite close to market 
action, such as the nature of contractual or organizational ties. Second, institutional 
analysis can also analyze formal institutions, such as property relations or regulatory 
frameworks. In the context of VoC, labor market and corporate governance frameworks are 
also important formal institutions. Third, institutional analysis can also focus on an even 
higher level related to the general social embeddedness of economic action, including 
norms, values and culture. As Williamson notes, such issues are key concerns of social 
theory.32 
This article shows that each of these books approximates one of these forms of 
institutional analysis. Walter and Zhang’s approach is governance-centered, as they analyze 
differences across East and South East Asia with respect to patterns of economic 
governance and the actors shaping it.  Schneider’s approach is firm-centered and closest in 
spirit to the original VoC framework, given that firm behavior is also related to a variety of 
formal institutions, such as ownership and corporate forms, and key regulatory institutions. 
Bohle and Greskovits’s book is state-centered and can be seen as an example of the third 
approach, since it focuses on the social and political embeddedness of economic activity. 
The following discussion explores the insights into capitalist diversity provided by these 
three books in more detail. 
Schneider, Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America. 
 Among the books discussed here, Ben Ross Schneider’s approach is closest in spirit to 
the original VoC framework. It maintains the focus on firms and market institutions and 
considers the core building blocks of this approach, such as coordination mechanisms and 
institutional complementarities. Schneider proposes two new varieties of capitalism based on 
distinct logics of coordination: hierarchy and trust. He labels the economies where these two 
logics of coordination predominate hierarchical and networked market economies respectively. 
The hierarchical market economy model is the main focus of his book and shown to 
characterize the principal Latin American economies, though Schneider suggests that it could 
apply to other countries as well, including Turkey, Thailand (and possibly elsewhere in South 
East Asia) and South Africa (p. 5). In hierarchical market economies (HMEs), the main actors are 
multinational enterprises and diversified business groups which manage economic activity 
largely by means of hierarchical relationships, where decisions are made at the apex of the 
business group (often by the dominant figures in an extended family) or at the corporate 
headquarters of the multinational corporation in the home country. 
In networked market economies (NME) repeated exchange in the context of long-
term network relations create a very different kind of dynamic – not based on bargained 
adjustment as in CMEs, but implicit long-term contracts or norms, as exemplified by the 
traditional commitment to lifelong employment and long-term inter-firm network relations 
in Japan. The NME model is discussed more briefly, and Schneider offers less evidence to 
demonstrate its applicability, though he views Japan and also Taiwan as good examples 
(Schneider, p. 29). He also notes that several East Asian economies contain elements of 
CME, NME and HME institutions (p.30).  
TABLE 1 HERE 
A key strength of Schneider’s approach is that it is theoretically elegant and 
parsimonious. Instead of inductively classifying a wide range of institutional arrangements, it 
proceeds deductively to identify analytically distinct coordination mechanisms based on 
organizational theory and shows how institutional configurations reflect complementarities 
between different institutional domains in the context of a firm-centered view of markets and 
capitalism. (p.21). This framework also incorporates multinational corporations as key actors, 
which highlights the importance of globalization and the extent to which developments in 
HMEs depend on decisions of external actors. 
Another strength of this approach is its explanatory potential. Schneider convincingly 
demonstrates that limited incentives to invest in skills and innovation and associated 
outcomes, such as inequality, growth, patterns of skill acquisition and corporate governance, 
relate to these institutions. Schneider shows how an institutional logic underpins these 
outcomes, in that HME institutions shape incentives and actor strategies. His approach also 
helps advance the VoC agenda beyond the focus on efficiency as it demonstrates that 
institutions can shape performance not only in positive ways, but also in adverse fashion. The 
logic of institutional complementarities reinforces strategies and outcomes, but many of them, 
including corporate diversification, are not primarily based on maximization of efficiency, but 
on the goal of managing and reducing risk (p.49). In Schneider’s framework, the logic of 
complementarities can help lock in unfavorable outcomes, such as low-skill traps, weak 
corporate governance arrangements and high levels of inequality, all of which makes 
sustainable growth associated with improvements in human development hard to achieve (pp. 
90-138). These outcomes can also be understood as manifestations of the middle-income trap, 
which is common in HMEs.33 
In Schneider's conceptualization, the underlying politics of capitalism revolves around 
interest representation, and the incentives and influence of powerful actors are the main 
explanation of key outcomes. As in the original VoC model, Schneider stresses lock-in effects 
that contribute to the durability of key institutions and their long-run effects on Latin American 
political economies. He does not focus on the historical roots of these arrangements, as his 
emphasis is on understanding continuity and mutual reinforcements. This is important, as key 
corporate forms, like diversified business groups, and hierarchical coordination mechanisms 
have largely survived Latin America’s transition to democracy and economic neoliberalism 
intact (p. 9). 
Like many contributions to the study of the politics of VoC in OECD countries, which 
have shown that LMEs tend to have majoritarian electoral systems and that CMEs tend to have 
proportional representation systems34, Schneider puts great emphasis on electoral systems and 
especially the combination of a strong presidency (elected according to a majoritarian logic) and 
legislatures elected according to proportional representation (PR) in HMEs (pp. 141-149). He 
argues that PR systems facilitate the representation of specific interests, which in the absence of 
strong encompassing associations of the kind common in European CMEs means that individual 
firms and sectors are often well represented. To account for the influence of these interests, it is 
essential to consider not only their access to power, but also their strategies and preferences. 
These actors are generally interested in safeguarding existing privileges and favorable 
regulations. The most powerful economic actors, notably business groups, have a strong 
interest in the status quo, as it supports their competitive advantage. Since Latin American 
presidents rarely enjoy majority support in the legislature, they often make deals with other 
parties and sometimes individual legislators (who often represent the interests of specific 
sectors or firms) to get support for key initiatives. 
Nevertheless, despite the overarching emphasis on continuity, Schneider’s account is 
not deterministic. He considers both actual and potential institutional change. Schneider notes 
that after 2000, Latin American political economies have developed along three distinct paths – 
continued neoliberalism (Mexico and Chile), nationalist developmentalism (Argentina and 
Brazil) and left populism (Venezuela and Bolivia) (p.161). Schneider does not discuss the left-
populist path of Venezuela and Bolivia, arguing that these countries have moved towards a form 
of state or political capitalism beyond the remit of his book, but he offers a detailed discussion 
of the other two trajectories and the prospects for institutional change that might help them 
escape the low-skill trap. The argument he develops to explain institutional change is complex 
and contingent, stressing a combination of favorable legacies and luck (rising commodity prices) 
as well as strategic investments by firms and governments. However, globalization is another 
 
important factor, as it is primarily global market conditions related to the rise of China and 
resulting increases in the demand for natural resources that drive these changes by pushing up 
commodity prices (p.168). The upshot of this analysis is that a combination of factors could help 
countries, like Chile and Brazil, break out of the low-skill trap by investing more in research and 
development and upgrading technologies. If this happens on a larger scale and over a prolonged 
period, it may be possible to move away from the HME model of capitalism in Latin America. 
Although Schneider notes important differences between Chile and Brazil, he argues that they 
are the most likely candidates to achieve greater economic success, partly facilitated by 
increasingly programmatic parties and relatively good governance (p.162).35  
 
Walter and Zhang, East Asian Capitalism 
Walter and Zhang’s typology departs from the original VoC framework in several 
respects, most importantly by focusing on economic governance. They consider two 
dimensions of economic governance: social coordination and state organization of the 
economy. These dimensions capture the degree of involvement by a variety of social 
actors and the state in the governance of the economy.  While economic activity and firm 
behavior are expected to follow from this, the framework is less firm-centered than the 
original Hall and Soskice model or Schneider’s model.  
Given that both dimensions of economic organization identified by Walter and 
Zhang can be either high or low, this generates four types of VoC based on distinct logical 
combinations of organizational attributes (see Table 2): state-led, co-governed, 
networked and personalized market economies.36   
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
This typology has several distinctive features. First, Walter and Zhang’s emphasis on 
the social connections between economic actors is different from the kind of 
institutionalized bargaining between unions and employers’ associations which 
characterizes strategic coordination in CMEs, but which is rare in East Asia given the nature 
of unions and other collective actors.  
 
Second, Walter and Zhang explicitly incorporate the state as a core dimension into 
the basic typology of capitalism, though they allow the role of the state in economic 
governance to vary between high and low. Third, given that Walter and Zhang’s analysis is 
governance-centered, their framework is well placed to extend the focus beyond the firm 
and consider the role of multiple economic governance mechanisms. 
While Walter and Zhang are very successful at characterizing intra-regional variation in 
their overview chapter (an objective to which Schneider pays more limited attention), their 
analysis raises several challenges. First, while every classificatory framework involves borderline 
cases, the fact that Walter and Zhang’s framework is not based on typological distinctions, but 
on dimensions that vary by degree raises questions about cut-offs between ‘high’ and ‘low’. The 
cut-off between networked and co-governed VoCs is particularly hard to define, since there is 
some state involvement in every economy. This ambiguity is reflected in the fact that Schneider 
defines both Taiwan and Japan as networked market economies (p.29), whereas Walter and 
Zhang see the former as co-governed and the latter as networked (p.17). While it may be almost 
impossible to define specific numerical cut-offs, the discussion of the typology is couched in 
terms of general tendencies with many sentences incorporating words like ‘may’ or ‘likely’ 
 
(Walter and Zhang, p. 18). This reinforces the challenge of identifying how much involvement 
there would need to be for an economy to shift from one of these categories to the other. To 
this one might add the general controversy surrounding Japan, which is sometimes classified as 
a coordinated market economy.37  
Second, the fourth VoC they identify, namely personalized capitalism, also raises 
analytical challenges. Since it is characterized by only modest state organization and weak social 
coordination, economic activity is effectively defined with respect to what it lacks and almost by 
default described as personalized. The chapters of the book identify a variety of regularities and 
demonstrate that personalized activity is not idiosyncratic but shaped by institutions, norms and 
specific profit incentives. Yet the analytical logic of personalized economic activity is somewhat 
underspecified. It seems that certain kinds of social ties, such as relational finance or hierarchies 
within family-owned firms, are essential to the functioning of personalized capitalism (pp. 18-
19, see also chapters 4 and 9). Given the importance of such hierarchies, Schneider classifies 
Thailand as an HME, while Walter and Zhang categorize Thailand as personalized capitalism. 
Third, there is some tension between chapters in the book. While the editors classify 
Thailand and the Philippines as personalized and Indonesia and Malaysia as state-led, Pepinsky’s 
chapter proposes different classifications for the financial systems of these countries (apart 
from the Philippines). Pepinsky classifies the financial systems of Indonesia as personalized, 
Malaysia as co-governed and Thailand as networked (Pepinsky in Walter and Zhang, p. 191). 
While Pepinsky agrees with the editors’ overall classification of these political economies 
(Pepinsky in Walter and Zhang, p. 180), such differences are potentially quite significant. As 
some of these differences in classification also relate to institutional fields within single 
economies, this might require paying more attention to sub-national and sectoral VoC 
 
(Schneider, p. 22; Walter and Zhang, pp. 270-273). If there is extensive sub-national and 
sectoral variation, this raises important challenges for theories of institutional 
complementarities, which assume that economic performance is enhanced by 
complementary labor and financial institutions based on the same logic of coordination. 
How much can a core institutional domain like the financial system differ from other key 
institutions of the political economy without undermining the coherence of the system?38 In 
this context, the logic and interrelations of different logics of coordination within individual 
economies warrant further attention, not least since this could shed light on the debate 
about different kinds of complementarities. There is some disagreement in the existing 
literature about the economic advantages of coherence and hybridity.39 Similarly, the 
literature has also raised the possibility of complementarities that serve other purposes, 
such as risk minimization or political objectives, as well as looser relationships between 
institutional domains based on synergies.40 Walter and Zhang’s inductive approach of 
exploring the evolution of governance mechanisms across different institutional fields is a 
valuable intermediate step towards a more systematic theorization of complementarities 
and synergies in these economies. 
While there is some variation across chapters, Walter and Zhang develop a helpful 
overarching framework for understanding the politics of institutional stability and change. 
Their analysis focuses on three sets of variables, namely coalitions of interests, state 
actions and capacity, and policy discourses. This framework analyzes economic institutions 
as a reflection of power relations shaped by the interaction of state actors and other 
interest groups and where power is rooted in both material and ideational factors. For 
example, Walter and Zhang note that political and economic actors may make strategic use 
of dominant discourses to justify policy reform and weaken opposition to it (p.24). 
The same factors can be used to study the politics of both continuity and change, as 
it is effectively the balance of forces that determines the degree of institutional change. 
Walter and Zhang explicitly build on recent historical institutionalist research to 
conceptualize institutional change as gradual and stress that change rather than stability is 
the norm.41  Individual chapters offer more detailed explorations of these issues. For 
example, the chapter by Zhang on Northeast Asia focuses on the centrality of dominant 
interest group coalitions. In his chapter on financial development in Southeast Asia, 
Pepinsky observes that economic institutions have multiple effects – notably, financial 
development strengthens political elites by fostering economic growth and simultaneously 
weakens them by empowering other actors. This observation goes to the heart of the 
debate about the politics of capitalist diversity, namely the degree to which institutions are 
maintained for efficiency reasons as opposed to other socio-political goals. Pepinsky’s 
analysis demonstrates how sophisticated comparative case studies can illustrate the 
interaction of different effects and causal processes over time, thereby contributing to 
varying degrees of stability and change. 
Despite considerable institutional change, Walter and Zhang argue that the four East 
Asian VoC have been remarkably resilient (p. 274), but they note that the politics of 
institutional change may vary across key institutional domains (p.277). As the chapter by Sako 
and Kotosaka highlights, there has been more extensive institutional change in Japanese labor 
market institutions than in financial markets in recent decades, but it remains unclear whether 
this will ultimately lead to systemic change (Sako and Kotosaka in Walter and Zhang, p.156). This 
 
raises important challenges for theories of institutional complementarities: if there is more change 
in some areas than others, does this mean that the system as a whole loses its overarching 
coherence (p. 278)? The existing literature suggests different possibilities. First, change in one area 
could trigger further changes eventually leading to the emergence of new kind of VoC, especially if 
the process of change originates in an institutional domain that is central to the functioning of 
political economies, such as corporate governance.42  Second, some change could also be 
essential for maintaining existing institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, the significance of such 
processes remains controversial. Labor market dualization in CMEs can be seen either as 
underpinning the existing model by enhancing flexibility or as the source of new contradictions 
and tensions that could ultimately undermine it.43  
Future research could build on these insights. It would be interesting to learn more about 
the interactions and relative influence of the three factors identified by Walter and Zhang. For 
example, it might be worth considering whether the state contributes more to institutional 
change in state-led and co-governed VoC than in other systems where the state plays a more 
limited role,and whether the discursive dimension matters more in some periods, like economic 
crises, than under other circumstances. Such a refinement of Walter and Zhang’s framework could 
be an important contribution to theories of institutional change. 
 
Bohle and Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery 
Bohle and Greskovits’s book seeks to challenge earlier scholarship on capitalist diversity in East 
Central Europe, much of which has engaged with VoC theory in recent years. Some scholars have 
sought to build on classical VoC analysis and identified 'emerging VoC' in East Central Europe, 
though such scholarship has also stressed that only a small number of post-communist 
economies, notably Slovenia and Estonia, are likely to come close to fitting the basic Hall and 
Soskice typology.44 
Therefore, others have sought to build new models in the spirit of VoC analysis. For 
example, Markus and Mendelski have complemented the analysis of economic coordination with 
detailed attention to governance institutions related to the rule of law. 45  Myant and 
Drahokoupil proceed more inductively to analyze patterns of global integration and highlight five 
forms of post-communist capitalism: foreign investment-based, peripheral, oligarchic-
clientelistic, order states and remittance-based economies. 46  The most influential post-
communist VoC model is Nölke and Vliegenthart's Dependent Market Economy (DME) model, 
which was developed to analyze the four East Central European economies of Poland, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia.47  It resembles Schneider's HME model, in that it highlights the 
centrality of foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises and how this shapes these 
economies and their institutions. However, there are two crucial differences. First, the DME 
model focuses only on foreign direct investment and not on diversified business groups, as such 
groups have not developed in the post-communist world on a scale comparable to Latin America. 
Indeed one could view the DME model as a special case of an HME, in which only one of the two 
core corporate forms, namely multinational enterprises, is prominent (Bohle and Greskovits, p. 
11). Second, compared to the HME model, the DME model is perceived to be more successful. 
The strategy of attracting foreign direct investment could be viewed as an effective way of 
stimulating growth and structural change, although Nölke and Vliegenthart raise questions about 
its medium-term viability. It is possible that the DME model will eventually turn out to be less 
successful, because it could be undermined by its own success (if higher wages and costs induce 
foreign investors to move elsewhere) or because it does not facilitate upgrading and more 
sustainable growth.48 
The book by Bohle and Greskovits builds on this earlier literature on post-communist 
diversity, but it also seeks to depart from VoC analysis in a more radical way. Bohle and 
Greskovits attempt to rethink capitalist diversity in post-communist East Central Europe by 
basing their analysis on the premise that there is only one core logic of capitalism.49 Therefore, 
the main factors differentiating political economies are political, and this article classifies their 
framework for understanding capitalist diversity in East Central Europe as a state-centered 
approach. Building on Polányi’s analysis of capitalism in the Great Transformation, they argue 
that every state in a capitalist economy faces the core challenge of balancing markets, social 
cohesion and political legitimacy (p. 15) and that there are multiple and historically specific ways 
of doing this.50 It may not be possible to identify such logics purely on theoretical grounds 
without considering particular countries and historical contexts (p. 15). Like the literature on 
the developmental state, Bohle and Greskovits identify variation in the role of the state as 
the key factor shaping the functioning of economies. In post-communist East Central 
Europe, Bohle and Greskovits identify three kinds of political economies. 
First, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are defined as a relatively 
pure form of neoliberalism, where social spending and state intervention in the economy are 
limited. Bohle and Greskovits relate this outcome to the reestablishment of Baltic 
independence after half a century. Given that the majority populations have been preoccupied 
with rebuilding the nation state, they were willing to accept neoliberalism as long as the 
nationalist social contract was satisfied (pp.96-137). 
Second, the ‘embedded neoliberalism’ characteristic of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia also belongs to the general category of neoliberalism, but it is 
underpinned by more activist social and industrial policy. These policies can be said to 
embed markets in that they induce the populations to consent to neoliberalism and foreign 
investors to invest in these countries (pp. 138-181). 
Finally, like various other scholars, they view the Slovenian political economy as the 
only example of neocorporatist policy-making in the region (pp 182-222).51 The Slovenian 
model is based on an inclusive and negotiated agreement between the government and key 
social actors and associated with relatively egalitarian outcomes that has also facilitated 
growth and investment. 
It should be noted that many aspects of the institutional and policy differences they 
uncover have some affinity with traditional VoC analyses of these countries, including their labor 
markets, with countries in the three groups classified as approximating key features of liberal, 
dependent and coordinated market economies.52 The most important difference between such 
VoC analyses and Bohle and Greskovits’s Polányian framework relates to the role of the state (pp. 
16-17, p.182). For Bohle and Greskovits, capitalist systems do not reflect institutional 
complementarities. The emergence of such institutions should be viewed as a profoundly 
political process where politicians seek to balance a variety of economic objectives and to 
maintain popular support for existing policies that give markets a free rein or seek to re-embed 
them in various ways. Each of the three models of capitalism they identify is based on a 
distinctive political settlement. 
The origins of each model of capitalism are attributable to three sets of factors. First, 
Bohle and Greskovits emphasize the central importance of the initial reform choices in the 
 
early 1990s after the collapse of communism (p. 80). Decisions by policy makers were unusually 
significant as institutions were in flux. New institutions were being crafted, and considerable 
policy autonomy also derived from the fact that many conventional interest groups did not 
exist or were less active than usual. Second, Bohle and Greskovits discuss the importance of 
uncertainty and crisis, which implies that policy-makers did not have the luxury of devising 
long-term strategic plans, as they had to respond to shocks and unexpected events (p. 4). 
When this happens on a large scale, then the cumulative effect of a variety of crisis 
management tools on institutional arrangements is considerable. Finally, Bohle and Greskovits 
also put great emphasis on the transnational dimension of politics. While they stress that 
domestic agency was ultimately most important and judiciously avoid any claims suggesting 
international determinism, they note the influence of international models and the limits to 
pursuing growth without promoting exports and FDI (p. 82). 
The Bohle and Greskovits framework could constitute a more profound challenge to the 
study of institutions, in that it shifts the focus away from studying stability and change and 
instead towards contradictions and fragility and how such tensions are reconciled at certain 
moments in time.  These models are therefore best understood not as equilibria, but as what 
Jessop has termed fragile ‘spatio-temporal fixes’ that can break down either due to economic 
contradictions or a loss of political support.53 Therefore support for existing arrangements 
cannot be taken for granted and must be constantly recreated, which also implies that the 
model can be used to study institutional change. While Bohle and Greskovits describe a variety 
of pressures and changes, the causal mechanisms underpinning change are not entirely clear. 
Change seems to result from at least three different processes – changes in elite strategies 
(either autonomous or coerced by circumstances, such as the shift away from nationalist 
mobilization to financialized growth in the Baltic States) (p. 228), exogenous pressures (such as 
the global financial crisis) or endogenous pressures, related to exhaustion of previous models, 
such as unsustainable debt levels related to financialization (chapter 6). While each of these 
explanatory factors is plausible, there is no explicit theory of institutional change, perhaps 
because Bohle and Greskovits see institutions as inherently fragile.  
 
COMPARING THE THREE APPROACHES 
The three books illustrate distinct strategies for extending and modifying the VoC 
debate. These approaches reflect core ideas of VoC scholarship, notably that economic 
action is embedded in institutions. The core challenge of extending VoC beyond the OECD 
relates to the need to theorize a wider range of economic action and institutions, and as the 
overview of the three books has demonstrated, they approach this task in distinctive ways. 
These differences can be illustrated by briefly discussing three case studies, including an 
example from each of these regions (Thailand, Brazil, and Hungary), where the analysis of 
these frameworks diverge.  
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Schneider defines both Thailand and Brazil as hierarchical market economies. This 
reflects Schneider’s firm-centered approach, which leads him to emphasize the centrality of 
business groups in both economies. Schneider discusses several influential Brazilian business 
groups, such as Votorantim, Embraer, and Villares, and he offers a nuanced assessment of 
their importance to the Brazilian economy in terms of investment and employment across 
multiple sectors. Schneider argues that Thailand should also be seen as an HME (p. 5). 
Though he provides less evidence, this assessment is consistent with a significant body of 
literature on the centrality of business groups to the Thai economy.54 
However, based on Walter and Zhang’s approach, these two economies would be 
classified as different kinds of capitalist systems. Walter and Zhang regard Thailand as a 
personalized market economy, given the weakness of state and social coordination, 
especially since the 1990s. Social coordination has declined over time, as manifested by a 
weakening of business associations and especially inter-corporate networks in recent 
decades.55   
While Walter and Zhang do not consider countries beyond East and South East Asia, 
Brazil could be classified as a state-led market economy (or possibly a co-governed market 
economy) based on their typology. This is consistent with other studies that view Brazil 
along with China and India as a ‘state-permeated market economy’56 or simply as a form of 
‘state capitalism’.57 While there is broad agreement that contemporary Brazil does not fit 
the traditional developmental state model, the coordinating role of the state remains 
important.58 Key examples of this include state ownership in a few strategic sectors, an 
active role as a minority shareholder in some other firms and perhaps most importantly the 
centrality of BNDES as a strategic investor and funder of investment projects.59 
These classificatory differences are not contradictory, as they are based on different 
levels of analysis. Walter and Zhang focus on market governance, whereas Schneider 
focuses on the key market actors and institutions. While more research would be needed to 
explore the interconnections between these frameworks, the comparison of these two 
cases suggests some possible lessons. First, business group dominance can coincide with 
different forms of economic governance. This is an important finding, not least since the 
HME model captures key elements of many political economies across the Global South. 60   
Therefore, more attention to economic governance could help distinguish between sub-
types and identify variation within this large category. Second, this also raises questions 
about the specific logics of interaction between business structure and governance, which 
are likely to vary across such cases. The Thai case shows that the influence of business 
actors can be substantial in the absence of coherent state control of the economy. On the 
other hand, the roles of the state and of business groups could be seen as complementary 
or mutually reinforcing in the Brazilian case, as many state policies support domestic 
business groups. This relates to Richard Carney’s suggestion that both the state and 
business groups are hierarchical actors and that state-led and family business group-led 
market economies could be viewed as two sub-varieties of hierarchical capitalism.61 
However, if the role of the state overshadows private business, this raises the possibility of a 
form of state capitalism that is distinct from hierarchical market economies. Schneider 
suggests that this has been the case in Venezuela (p. 39).  
We can also compare Schneider’s approach to the framework developed by Bohle 
and Greskovits. Although they do not cover the same countries, dependent market 
economies (DME) are a special case of HMEs dominated by multinational enterprises, but 
without any significant role for business groups (Bohle and Greskovits, p. 11). Schneider also 
mentions the DME model and also suggests that HMEs in which the role of business groups 
is weakening could be converging on the DME model, as seemed to be the case in Argentina 
around the turn of the millennium (p. 75).  
As noted above, the DME model was developed to account for the economic 
structure of Hungary and other East Central European economies. It analyzes the significant 
contribution of FDI to exports, growth and employment in these countries and highlights the 
high dependence of the Hungarian economy on foreign investment. It also explores the 
complementarities between economic institutions and the economic strategies of 
multinational enterprises which constitutes the general context in which any Hungarian 
government has to operate and formulate economic policy.62  
While Bohle and Greskovits also view foreign investment as central to the 
functioning of the Hungarian and other Central European economies, they analyze the 
presence of multinational enterprises as the outcome of the embedded neoliberal policies 
pursued by the state. The multinationals have responded to positive inducements offered 
by the state, and strategic use of welfare policies has ensured popular support for this policy 
regime as well. Therefore, a key strength of Bohle and Greskovits’s framework lies in their 
political account of the emergence of the dependence on foreign investment. Building on 
the economic transition literature, they show how strategic government decisions have 
shaped the economy by attracting foreign investment – thereby also responding to Nölke 
and Vliegenthart’s plea for more research uncovering the class and state configurations 
leading to the emergence of a DME.63 Bohle and Greskovits’s framework can also shed light 
on the politics of change – given that any institutional arrangement is fragile and support 
has to be recreated at various times, it opens up the possibility for agency by political 
leaders, who seek to craft new settlements. Since coming to power in 2010, Hungarian 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been able to build support for a strategy that has sought to 
attenuate dependency on Western Europe, notably by drawing on a more nationalistic 
legitimation strategy that contests some aspects of EU and Western influence. On the one 
hand, this involves promoting domestic capitalists loyal to the regime.64 On the other hand 
this also entails a strategic opening to the East to deepen political and economic ties 
especially with Russia and China. While these initiatives have not fundamentally challenged 
the overwhelming economic predominance of Western firms and investments, they 
highlight a different legitimation strategy that changes the political underpinnings of the 
Hungarian economy and are designed to signal that the government has greater political 
autonomy.65 
More generally, this comparison suggests that there are trade-offs between the 
strategies that these books adopt. While each of them analyzes the institutional 
embeddedness of capitalism, the particular strategy for extending the VoC debate that each 
of them adopts has consequences for the kinds of questions they can answer. Each of these 
studies can be related to different levels of analysis, broadly corresponding to Williamson’s 
distinction between three forms of institutional analysis that focus on governance (Walter 
and Zhang), formal rules of the game, such as the nature of property (Schneider) and social 
embeddedness (Bohle and Greskovits).66 This means that it may not be possible to address 
the three challenges to the VoC framework at once, and each book opens up a distinctive 
research agenda.    
First, Schneider’s book is most faithful to the original VoC framework, given its firm-
centered approach. For Schneider, capitalism and market institutions is best understood as 
analytically separate from the state (pp. 3-4). This means that it is possible to study the influence 
of the state and the political sphere on the functioning of the economy as well as the ways in 
which market institutions constrain politics.  
It is the most successful of the three books in terms of developing a nuanced 
theory that can explain variation in economic performance by showing that institutional 
complementarities can have negative effects in terms of limiting investments in skills and 
innovation. It also integrates some concerns associated with the literature inspired by 
dependency theory, namely the contradictory effects of globalization. It highlights the 
ways in which reliance on foreign direct investment can make beneficial contributions to 
economic growth, but also contribute to locking in certain structural disadvantages that 
could perpetuate the middle-income trap.  
More generally, Schneider’s book also relates to recent debates about economic 
development, which have emphasized the importance of institutions to economic 
growth. A key insight of the VoC agenda relates to the fact that the economic effects of 
institutions also depend on complementary institutions, which means that there are 
multiple paths to economic success and also that institutions cannot necessarily be 
assessed in the abstract without considering other institutions. This also resonates with 
the ideas advanced by some proponents of the post-Washington consensus within the 
World Bank, namely that economic success depends on a variety of contextual factors 
and local conditions.67 In a similar vein, Dani Rodrik has analyzed successful economic 
reform as a process of removing binding constraints on growth.68 By studying various 
institutional logics and complementarities, a global VoC approach could help to advance 
this research agenda and analyze such binding constraints in a more systematic way. As 
such binding constraints vary across countries, it becomes essential to study specific 
institutional contexts that shape them. The focus on interactions between institutions 
inherent in the VoC tradition could offer opportunities to define and operationalize such 
contexts in ways that are amenable to comparative study. For example, in HMEs there 
are both supply and demand constraints on skill investments, as neither workers nor 
employers expect any significant returns, though increasing public investment in skills 
and education could change this calculus. In state-led market economies, the binding 
constraint is most likely to be related to state action or inaction, as the state plays a 
crucial role in economic coordination and also in setting expectations.69 Future work 
could develop these ideas by means of systematic comparisons of institutional contexts 
across different VoC, which could also help refine our understanding of the conditions 
under which complementary institutions are most likely to be efficiency-enhancing and 
when they are more likely to serve other goals, such as risk minimization or the 
maintenance of political power.  
Second, Walter and Zhang’s approach offers the most fine-grained analysis of 
economic coordination in that it does not analytically privilege either firms or the state, 
thereby avoiding firm- or state-centeredness. This framework makes it easier to capture 
empirical variation across cases and identify subtypes of HMEs, as demonstrated in the 
discussion of Thailand and Brazil. Their volume focuses on the stability and evolution of 
these governance mechanisms, but it does not systematically relate institutions to 
comparative economic performance, innovation or patterns of specialization. Since it does 
not systematically theorize institutional complementarities and comparative institutional 
advantage, more work is needed to relate their models of capitalism to questions of 
economic performance and growth. Therefore, Walter and Zhang’s framework is most 
useful as a complement to Schneider’s framework and could be used to distinguish between 
subtypes of HMEs. In future work, there would be scope for more systematic integration of 
these frameworks. In particular, it would be interesting to explore whether the economic 
governance mechanisms analyzed by Walter and Zhang can be related to the performance 
of HMEs, for example, by stimulating innovation or skill investment.  
Finally, harking back to the study of the state in classical development theory and 
Polanyi’s account of embedded markets, Bohle and Greskovits show that capitalist diversity 
can be theorized as resulting from different state strategies, which partly reflect other 
factors, such as geographical proximity to Western Europe and historical factors. State 
strategies can be expected to shape growth during large-scale transformations, like the 
introduction of markets and market-supporting institutions in East Central Europe. While 
Bohle and Greskovits highlight some trade-offs between growth, macroeconomic stability 
and distributional outcomes, their framework implies that the most successful economies 
(except for the outlier of Slovenia) are those that attract the largest stock of foreign 
investment, especially into the most advanced forms of manufacturing. This is an insightful 
contribution to our understanding of post-communist economies, as foreign direct 
investment has certainly shaped their growth performance over the past 25 years. Yet this 
does not provide a full explanation of the productivity of these investments or even their 
long-term viability. In particular, questions related to medium-term comparative advantage, 
upgrading or innovation receive little attention in Bohle and Greskovits’s book. This raises 
question about whether foreign investors are likely to stay in these countries or look for 
new opportunities in lower cost economies.70 Would new inducements be necessary and 
sufficient to attract new investments or to retain pre-existing multinationals, or are there 
other foundations of comparative advantage that relate to the firms’ strategies and sectoral 
specialization? And to what extent can firm performance and strategies be explained by 
government industrial policy and the promotion of FDI? While the emphasis on the role of 
the state in shaping growth strategies has some affinities with the classical developmental 
state literature, Bohle and Greskovits place greater emphasis on how elites build support for 
reform strategies. The most important contribution of the book is the comparative historical 
account of the processes and outcomes of the structural transformation of these post-
communist countries and the diverse ways in which their governments managed to 
maintain political support for these processes. While the insights about the political 
construction of these reform trajectories are important, more research would be needed to 
show how generalizable these pathways are. A similar kind of analysis could potentially be 
used to analyze the origins of other forms of capitalism, including the HME model. For 
example, the strategic government responses to the Great Depression in Latin America, 
including the move towards import-substituting industrialization and the promotion of 
domestic businesses, could potentially be analyzed by drawing on Bohle and Greskovits’s 
approach. Given that the Great Depression is widely seen as a critical juncture in Latin 
American development, this might provide some further insight into the historical and 
political roots of the hierarchical market economies analyzed by Schneider.71 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has explored three seminal contributions to globalizing the VoC debate 
and identified three key lessons from these books - both for the VoC debate and for 
studying emerging markets and economic development. 
First, these books suggest that the development of a global VoC perspective has 
great potential. If adapted in appropriate fashion, the VoC framework can be extended and 
shed light on the functioning of capitalism and the structure of economic institutions in the 
Global South. A global VoC approach can offer valuable insights into the political economy of 
development. This constitutes an exciting research agenda for scholars interested in the 
Global South, including opportunities to explore institutional variation and its effects on a 
wide range of outcomes, including growth, inequality, crises, innovation, and development. 
By going beyond the focus on the traditional OECD countries, this global approach can 
reinvigorate the VoC framework more generally. This has methodological advantages, as it 
allows the literature to consider a wider range of institutions and outcomes, such as output 
levels, growth and inequality as well as within-case variation of a larger number of 
countries. A global perspective on VoC can provide a richer account of a wider range of 
capitalist diversity, which contributes to a more nuanced assessment of the success and 
political underpinnings of the multiple manifestations of capitalist institutions. 
Second, these books demonstrate that traditional concerns of the development 
literature on the developmental state and dependency theory can be integrated into VoC 
analysis. While the state is a key analytical category in Walter and Zhang’s framework and 
an important background factor in Schneider’s framework, its centrality is particularly 
pronounced in Bohle and Greskovits’s work, which focuses on the role of the state in 
embedding and legitimating capitalism. External constraints are also integral to these books. 
Bohle and Greskovits show how attracting foreign investment is generally a necessary 
condition of successful post-communist growth. Schneider’s framework stresses the role of 
multinational enterprises in HMEs and the ways in which they promote investment, while 
simultaneously constraining development, given that they may perpetuate the middle-
income trap due to limited innovation and upgrading.  
Third, there are trade-offs between the approaches adopted in these books. Taken 
together, the three books represent an important advance in our understanding of the 
global diversity of capitalism, and they address common criticisms of the VoC approach 
related to the role of state, excessive firm-centeredness and a limited account of variation in 
economic performance. While the three approaches have different strengths, they can 
ultimately be viewed as complementary, as they do not address the same challenges. 
Schneider’s firm-centered approach builds on the core strengths of the VoC approach and 
shows how it can be extended to explain other kinds of capitalist systems. Its main strength 
is that it enables VoC analysis to go beyond the efficiency focus by offering a compelling 
account of the institutional underpinnings of varying degrees of economic success. Walter 
and Zhang’s approach considers further dimensions of economic coordination, which shows 
how firms, interest groups and the state interact in shaping economic governance and the 
institutional context of economic activity. The main contribution of this approach is that it 
provides a more fine-grained account of numerous governance mechanisms in economic 
systems, including the state. The main strength of Bohle and Greskovits’s approach involves 
demonstrating how political processes and state actors can shape the economy, especially 
during periods of profound transformation, and highlighting the importance of popular 
legitimacy to maintaining economic institutions. This suggests that each of these 
approaches enriches the VoC debate and makes distinctive contributions to it. Given the 
trade-offs between these approaches, there are no obvious grounds for favoring any of 
them, as they are useful for different purposes. Since firm-, governance- and state-centered 
approaches can make distinctive contributions to the understanding of institutions, 
Williamson’s plea for pluralism in institutionalist research also applies to the global VoC 
debate.72 
While these books make a significant contribution to our understanding of global 
varieties of capitalism, they point to several issues that should be explored in future 
research.  
First, more systematic analysis of connecting different varieties of capitalism to 
various economic outcomes, such as growth, sectoral specialization, innovation and 
inequality, would be necessary to assess the full potential of global VoC to contribute to 
debates about economic development. This would clarify the extent to which institutional 
arrangements are related to distinctive patterns of economic performance. There might be 
scope for connecting this literature to recent attempts to integrate these regions into the 
comparative welfare state literature as well.73  
Second, the theorization of non-OECD varieties needs to be further refined. 
Schneider makes important points in his discussion of the hazards of excessive 
multiplication of models and of going down an inductive route. Although Schneider argues 
that his extension of the VoC model offers the potential for theoretical closure (p. 22), it is 
not clear whether his framework exhausts the universe of varieties. Indeed, his own 
observations about state-dominated or political capitalism could be incorporated into a 
VoC type model (p.39), not least given the insights about state coordination of the 
economy in the Walter and Zhang volume.74 It is also important to refine the analysis of 
under-theorized varieties, like personalized capitalism (Walter and Zhang) that is largely 
defined with reference to what it lacks (but which Schneider would analyze as examples of 
the HME model). As noted above, differences in economic governance across institutional 
domains within economies would also warrant further study, as they could shed further 
light on the nature and significance of institutional complementarities. Disagreements 
about categorizing key cases across different frameworks suggest that more research is 
necessary before we achieve anything approximating a tentative consensus on classifying 
capitalist systems on a global scale, which is why more comparative analysis of economic 
governance across multiple institutional fields is an important task for future research.  
Third, and perhaps most ambitiously, future studies could explore whether it is 
possible to bridge the approaches discussed in this article. Given the analytical differences 
between them, it seems unlikely that a complete merger of these approaches would be 
desirable, but elements of these approaches could be used to complement the others. As 
suggested above, Bohle and Greskovits’s approach could potentially be applied to other 
regions to analyze the origin of capitalist diversity, including the political roots of the HME 
model. Walter and Zhang’s distinction between different forms of economic governance 
could be used to distinguish between subtypes of hierarchical market economies. Given the 
dominance of business groups alongside the importance of foreign direct investment across 
much of the Global South, understanding both commonalities and differences in economic 
governance and performance within this group is a very important task.75  
In conclusion, this article argues that there are important reasons for embracing the 
study of global varieties of capitalism and not keeping developing and developed countries 
separate as a matter of principle. In an increasingly global economy, many challenges, such 
as managing capital flows, attracting foreign investment and finding a niche in the global 
division of labor that harnesses domestic capacities and institutions, are common to most 
countries. Important differences between the most productive and richest countries in the 
world and developing countries obviously need to be theorized, but capitalist systems are 
increasingly interdependent and interconnected in global markets as well as global financial 
and production networks. As Schneider demonstrates, growth in Latin America cannot be 
understood without considering the investment strategies of US multinationals active in 
the region, and US growth and current account deficits can arguably not be fully 
understood without considering Chinese surpluses and lending.76 This article has shown 
that a global VoC framework can shed light on the diversity of capitalist systems across the 
world, and it has highlighted three different analytical strategies for extending this debate 
beyond the OECD and the trade-offs between them. 
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Table 1: The Schneider typology of capitalist diversity (p.23) 
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Economy 
Coordinated 
Market Economy 
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Market 
Economy 
Hierarchical 
Market 
Economy 
Allocative 
principle 
Markets Negotiation Trust Hierarchy 
Characteristic 
interaction 
among 
stakeholders 
Spot exchange Institutionalized 
meeting 
Reiterated 
exchange 
Order or 
directive 
Length of 
relationships 
Short Long Long Variable 
Representative 
case 
United States Germany Japan Chile 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
Table 2: Walter and Zhang typology of East Asian capitalism (p. 15) 
  Social coordination of economic action 
State organization of 
the economy 
 Strong Weak 
Extensive Co-governed State-led 
Modest Networked Personalized 
 
 
Table 3: Comparing the three approaches to extending the VoC debate 
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Greskovits 
Approach Firm-centered Governance-
centered 
State-centered 
Principal form of 
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Comparing the 
degree of state 
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social coordination 
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political legitimacy 
Principal empirical 
focus 
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Asia 
East Central Europe 
 
